Carolyn Joyce Bettinger nka Carolyn Boies v. Cass Bettinger : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Carolyn Joyce Bettinger nka Carolyn Boies v. Cass
Bettinger : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig M. Peterson E. Paul Wood; Littlefield and Peterson; Attorney for Appellant.
Robert M. McDonald; McDonalt and Bullen; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bettinger v. Bettinger, No. 880297 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1077
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
DOCKET NO. o o " ^ ? 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
-00O00-
-00O00-
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. 88-0297-CA 
Category 14(b) 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Craig M. Peterson 
E. Paul Wood 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Robert M. McDonald 
xMCDONALD & BULLEN 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DEPOSITED BY YHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG 16 1990 
APR 211989 
* *, 4 V> f^ 
% Court 
i4afApp«N*Hl 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. 88-0297-CA 
Category 14(b) 
-00O00-
Attorney for Appellant: 
Craig M. Peterson 
E. Paul Wood 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 11 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 12 
I. INTRODUCTION 12 
A. Standards of Appellate Review 13 
B. Principal of Interpretation of Judgments 13 
II. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 REQUIRING THAT 
MR. HETTINGER'S EQUITY BE DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF 
MRS. BOIES REMARRIAGE IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPALS OF LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION AND THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE 
FINDINGS THEREON 14 
A. The plain language of Paragraph 7 requires that 
equity be determined as of the date of sale . . . . 14 
B. Extrinsic evidence and the record are contrary to 
the findings and ruling of the court 16 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "IMPROVEMENTS 
BY PLAINTIFF" IS CONTRARY TO THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 7 
AND WAS MADE BY THE COURT WITHOUT A BASIS IN LAW OR 
FACT 18 
CONCLUSION 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P. 2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) 13 
Turner v. Turner, 649 P. 2d 6 (Utah 1982) 13 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1213, 1222 (Utah 1980) . . . . 13 
Boals v. Boals, 664 P. 2d 1191 (Utah 1983) 13 
Moon Lake Water Users Association v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 
1264 (Utah 1975) 13 
Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 
(Utah 1978) 13 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) 14 
Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Wheihing, 746 P.2d 279, 
283 (Utah App. 1987) 14 
Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed. 1968 15 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 1 
35205 
-ii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka ) 
CAROLYN BOIES, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
v. ) 
CASS BETTINGER, ) 
) Civil No. 88-0297-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. ) Category 14(b) 
ooOoo 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
under Section 78-2a-3 Utah Code Ann, in that it is an appeal from 
a final Order entered in a civil proceeding. The Appeal is from 
final orders entered by the Honorable David S. Young, Third 
District Court Judge, dated December 30, 1987 and March 11, 1988 
relating to enforcement and interpretation of the original 
Divorce Decree entered August 14, 1980. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court abuse its discretion by interpreting 
Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to require that the Defendant's 
equity in the parties marital domicile be determined "as of the 
date of remarriage" rather than "as of the date of sale"? 
2. Did the Court abuse its discretion by interpreting 
the term "improvements" in Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to 
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mean "capital improvements" only# thereby excluding all other 
kinds of improvements made by Plaintiff to the property from the 
date of the divorce to the date of the sale? 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 
Pursuant to a negotiated Stipulation read in open court, 
a Decree of Divorce was entered August 14, 1980 by the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya (Record pp. 21-24; Exhibit "A" hereto). 
Subsequently, pursuant to an Order to Show Hearing, an 
Order was entered March 24, 1986 by the Honorable Judith Billings 
granting judgment against Mr. Hettinger for child support 
arrearages and a Order to Withhold and Deliver (Record 212-213). 
On January 7, 1987, the Defendant moved the court to set aside 
its March 24, 1987 Order and an Order to Show Cause Hearing was 
scheduled for March 24, 1987 (Record 303-306). A hearing was 
held March 24 and April 9, 1987 on the Order to Show Cause 
issues. Appellant, Mrs. Boies, submitted an Affidavit in 
response to Defendant's Affidavit (Record 311-322; Exhibit "B" 
hereto). 
On August 13, 1987, the parties1 home was sold for a 
gross sales price of $91,500.00. 
On October 26, 1987, Mr. Bettinger moved the court for 
an order dividing proceeds of sale of the marital domicile pur-
suant to the Divorce Decree (Record 497-498). The Defendant sub-
mitted a Memorandum with Affidavits of Defendant and Affidavits 
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of Jerry F. Kellgren, a real estate appraiser, in support of his 
Motion (Record 485-508). The Plaintiff opposed the Defendant's 
Motion and submitted a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and 
an appraisal of Jerry R. Webber, a certified appraiser (Record 
519-535). The issues before the court on Defendant's Motion 
involved interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree. 
The issues were, under paragraph 7, the date upon which 
Defendant's equity should be determined, and the amount of 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's equity based upon the language of the 
Divorce Decree which states: 
"7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the 
marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien thereon 
for one-half of the equity that may be in the house at 
the time of liquidation (which contemplates an 
increasing equity as the value increases). The equity 
is defined as the fair market value or sales price at 
the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his 
lien as set forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, 
costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of 
sale. This lien shall not be forecloseable until the 
youngest child reaches 18, or until the home is sold or 
until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrenc eof any of 
these events, two-thirds of the house payments then made 
shall be converted to child support and that sum shall 
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be paid to the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as addi-
tional child support." 
After hearing on December 12, the court issued an Order 
on December 14, 1988 (attached as Exhibit "C") which inpertinent 
part states: 
"1. Defendant's equity in the marital domicile shall be 
determined on the basis of the market value of the marital domi-
cile in August, 1984. 
3. The Term "improvements" as stated in Paragraph 7 in 
the Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance 
the value of the marital domicile. 
4. In order to assist the parties in preparation for 
said hearing (scheduled January 19, 1988) The Court makes the 
following Preliminary Findings and Conclusion which remains sub-
ject to change or amendment. 
(a) The cost of the sale of the marital domicile shall 
be shared equally by the parties; 
(b) Plaintiff shall be liable for all unpaid taxes 
attributable to the periods after August, 1984." 
(Record 541-542) 
An Evidentiary Hearing was held before Judge Young, 
February 9, 1988 at which time Mrs. Boies and Mr. Bettinger 
appeared as witnesses and Jerry Kellgren testified as an expert 
on behalf of the Defendant and Jerry Webber testified as an 
expert on behalf of the Plaintiff. Among Plaintiff's exhibits, 
was a letter from Mr. Bettinger sent to Mrs. Boies in reply to 
her offer to purchase the property prior to August, 1984 (Exhibit 
P-3; Exhibit "D" hereto). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Young requested 
that counsel for respective parties submit memoranda of law and 
receipts or checks which reflected expenditures for improvements 
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to the marital domicile• The Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum set 
forth the position that Defendant's equity should be determined 
as of the date of sale pursuant to the Divorce Decree, that all 
improvements made by the Plaintiff and the costs of sale should 
be divided equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Record 
551-611). Attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum were Exhibits A, B 
and C. Exhibit A set forth the expenditures made by Plaintiff 
prior to her remarriage in August, 1984 (attached hereto as 
Exhibit "E", without supporting documentation in record); Exhibit 
B is a January 27, 1986 letter from Mr. Bettinger suggesting 
repairers of the home and a sale price (attached hereto as 
Exhibit "F"); Exhibit C were the expenditures made by Mrs. 
Bettinger after August, 1984, which related to the home, in the 
amount of $10,283.50 (attached as Exhibit "G", without supporting 
documentation in the file). 
Defendant's Trial Memorandum takes the position that the 
Defendant's equity is the fair market value in August, 1984, that 
any expenditures after August, 1984, by the Plaintiff are her 
responsibility and should not be deducted from equity, and that 
the costs of sale are the Plaintiff's responsibility (Record 
614-630). 
On February 18, 1988, the court filed its Memorandum 
Decision (Record 631-663; Exhibit "H" hereto); its Findings of 
^act and Conclusions of Law (Record 637-640; Exhibit "I" hereto) 
and the Order was filed March 11, 1988 (Record 645-646; Exhibit 
"J" hereto). 
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The pertinent portions of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are: 
A. Findings of Fact: 
2. Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984. Thereafter, 
she and her new husband occupied the marital domicile 
for a period of one year. After the 1-year period, 
Plaintiff and her new husband took up residence in 
another home. 
4» Subsequent to August 30, 1984, Plaintiff incurred 
the sum of $7,800.00 for installation of a gabled roof 
on the marital domicile and $164.79 for new screens on 
the marital domicile. These were capital improvements 
that enhanced the value of the home and gave rise to a 
corresponding increase in the market value of the home. 
5. Plaintiff made other expenditures with respect to 
the marital domicile. However, these additional expen-
ditures constituted normal maintenance and are not the 
responsibility of the Defendant. 
B. Conclusions of Law: 
1. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, Defendant is 
entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital domi-
cile determined as of the date of Plaintiff's remarriage 
on August 30, 1984. 
2. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, Defendant's 
share of the equity was due and payable on August 30, 
1984. 
f5. Each of the parties must bear one-half of the 
following costs and expenses: 
(a) Closing costs of $6,113.00; (b) Capital improve-
ments of $7,964.78. 
After entry of the Order on March 11, 1988, Mrs. Boies 
filed her Notice of Appeal May 5, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The meaning of Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce 
has been the subject of dispute between Mrs. Boies and Mr. 
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Bettinger through several different hearings involving payment of 
child support and interpretation of the language with respect to 
amount of equity to be divided as determined by application of 
the language. The only evidence on the negotiations of the 
Stipulation which led to the final Decree, and the intent of the 
parties is found in the Affidavit of Mrs. Boies dated April 9, 
1987. (Exhibit "B" hereto). Literally no other evidence during 
the course of any proceedings was submitted by either party 
regarding their intent when drafting and entering into the 
Stipulation. 
2. Paragraph 4 of Mrs. Boies Affidavit explains the 
purpose behind the language of the Agreement and the fact that 
the Stipulation was arrived at "after I had bargained away 
several claims I wanted in the divorce." Paragraph 4. A. states 
that initially, Mrs. Boies wanted custody of all four children 
and child support in the amount of $300.00 for a total support 
obligation of $1,200.00 per month. She proposed that she have 
possession for the house and that she would pay the mortgage on 
the property which would be subject to a lien in favor of Mr. 
Bettinger for one-half of the amount of equity as of 1980. 
Paragraph 4.B. states: 
"Defendant, Cass Bettinger, rejected this offer of 
settlement on my part and stated to me at the time that 
his reasons for rejecting the offer had to do with his 
perception of the increasing value of our home. Our 
home had doubled in value from the date we purchased it 
in the early 1970,s through the date of the divorce in 
1980. Cass Bettinger repeated expressed to me at the 
time of the divorce his belief the property would again 
double in value during the 1980,s and that he wanted to 
participate in that increase in equity on an investment 
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basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to 
arrive at a settlement whereby he would retain the house 
as an investment and continue to pay the mortgage on the 
property and whereby I would allow him to receive an 
increase in equity which might occur during the decade 
of the 1980's, rather than take one-half of the equity 
as it existed at the time of the Decree in 1980. He 
also agreed to pay one-half of the costs of improvements 
to- maintain his investment. To date, he has paid 
nothing." 
In addition, Paragraph 4.C. states: 
"To resolve my claim for child support and possession of 
the house and Cass Bettinger's competing claim for a 
continuing interest in any equity appreciation in the 
home, we arrived at the settlement contained in 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce separating the 
house and mortgage entirely from the child support. 
First, Paragraph 7, in its first sentence, contains our 
agreement that Defendant's equity interest in the home 
would be calculated as of the date of sale of the home, 
rather than as of 1980, which contemplated an increasing 
value of the equity. I was awarded the home and the 
lien to Cass Bettinger for one-half the "increasing" 
equity would be payable to him upon our youngest child 
reaching the age of 18 years, upon my election to sell 
the home or upon my remarriage. 
3. Mrs. Boies remarried on August 30, 1984. At the 
time of her remarriage, she proposed to buy out Mr. Bettinger1s 
equity in the home. (April 9, 1987 Affid., Para. 15, 16, 17, 18; 
February 9, 1987 Transcript, hereinafter; Tr. 34-35) In reply to 
her offer to purchase, Mr. Bettinger sent a letter stating he 
believed the home was worth $125,000.00 in good shape but no less 
than $100,000.00 and stated his desire that the home be imme-
diately listed for sale (Exhibit "B" hereto; Tr. 35-36). 
4. Prior to remarriage, Mrs. Boies, from 1981 to 1984, 
installed in the marital domicile, carpet throughout the home, a 
new disposal, new heater, new range, floor tile, roof repair and 
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several other items totalling $4,308.86 (Exhibit "E" hereto; 
Record 559). 
5. On January 27, 1986, Mr. Hettinger sent Mrs. Boies a 
letter stating that he had a realator walk through the house and 
he had several suggestions for improving the home, such as 
removing the walltex, replacing light fixtures, replacing 
paneling, installation of new carpets, paint the kitchen cabinet, 
etc. and estimated the cost to be Mfrom $5,000.00 to $10,000.00". 
Mr. Bettinger also made suggestions about the selling price pro-
viding various alternatives to deal with the sale of the home 
after which he states "Carolyn, I just want to get the house sold 
as fast as possible at a fair price. I think we have to do 
something. It's just not going to sell as in its present con-
dition and current price." (Exhibit "F" hereto; Record 582). 
Mrs. Boies remained in the house approximately 10 months until 
she and her husband moved to a condominium with their children. 
During 1984, 1985 and 1986, the home was continually listed for 
sale starting at a price of $125,000.00, as urged by Mr. 
Bettinger, and decreasing to $99,000.00. (Tr. 36-37). During 
that period of time, no one offered to purchase the home. In 
1986, the ceiling collapsed as a result of a leaking roof and 
Mrs. Boies decided to replace the flat roof with a gabled roof 
and repair the ceiling (Tr. 38-39). The cost of the roof was 
$7,800.00 (Tr. 43; Finding No. 4). In November, 1986, the home 
was relisted for sale at $93,000.00 and in March, 1987, an offer 
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was made for $91,500.00 which was ultimately accepted (Tr. 46). 
From August 30, 1984, to the date of sale of the property, Mrs. 
Boies made a variety of different repairs and replacements, espe-
cially relating to water damage, (including the new roof) in the 
amount of $10,283.50 (Exhibit "G" hereto; Record 585-586). 
6. The court found that the costs of sale were 
$6,113.00 (Finding No. 6; Record 638). 
7. From August, 1984, to the date of sale of the pro-
perty, Mr. Boies never attempted to foreclose on his "lien" for 
equity in the marital domicile. Additionally, he took the 
interest deduction for payment of the mortgage on the home each 
year (Para. 25, April 9, 1987 Boies Affid.). 
8. After the December 12, 1987 hearing and February 9, 
1988, hearing, the court found that Mr. Bettinger's equity should 
be determined as of the date of remarriage, and not the date of 
sale, contrary to the Affidavit of Mrs. Boies and the language of 
Paragraph 7. Further, the court construed the term 
"improvements" in Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to mean only 
"capital improvements" and thereby included only the cost of the 
gabled roof and the costs of decorative screens, together 
totalling $7,964.78 as "Plaintiff's improvements" to be deducted 
from the total equity and shared between the parties. All other 
expenditures made by Mrs. Boies from 1980 through 1987 were 
thereby excluded by the court's definition. The final sale price 
of the home was $91,500.00. 
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9. The court found that the Defendant's equity should 
be determined as of the date of remarriage. The court determined 
that the market value of the marital domicile on August 30, 1984 
was $95,000.00 with an unpaid first mortgage of $20,304.00 on 
that date (Finding No. 3; Record p. 638). For purposes of deter-
mining equity, in addition to subtracting the first mortgage as 
of August 30, 1984, the court subtracted $7,964.79 for 
"Plaintiff's improvements" and costs of sale as of August 13, 
1987 in the amount of $6,113.00 (Findings No. 4 and 6; Record 
638, Conclusions 1, 2, 5, 7; Record 639). 
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. The court held that, pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the 
Decree, equity should be determined as of the date of Mrs. Boies 
remarriage. The plain language of Paragraph 7 contemplates that 
Mr. Bettinger's equity will be determined as of the date of sale 
of the marital domicile. The court errored by interpreting 
Paragraph 7 contrary to its plain language. 
In the alternative, to construe the ambiguities con-
tained in Paragraph 7 of the Decree, the court is required to 
look at the evidence in the record which reflects the intent of 
the parties when drafting Paragraph 7. The only evidence 
directly on point is Mrs. Boies' Affidavit of April 9, 1987, 
which is directly contrary to the court's ruling. The court 
abused its discretion in that the evidence preponderates against 
the Findings and Conclusions, and the court failed to apply the 
-11-
law on construction of written documents i.e. the Judgment, 
relating to ambiguity therein. 
2. Paragraph 7 of the Decree states "the equity is 
defined as the fair market value or sales price at the time 
Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set forth 
herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements made 
by Plaintiff and costs of sale." The court held, without any 
basis in law or fact, that contrary to the plain language of 
Paragraph 7, "improvements" shall mean only "capital improve-
ments" made by the Plaintiff thereby excluding several thousands 
of dollars of improvements made to the marital domicile by Mrs. 
Boies. Additionally, the court entered no Findings or Conclusion 
as to the basis of its interpretation. The court's ruling is a 
clear abuse of discretion which significantly prejudices Mrs. 
Boies. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary issues raised in this appeal relate to the 
court's interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Decree. The court 
was obligated to follow existing principals of law in its 
interpretation which it failed to do. The following two sections 
of this Brief, II and III, will involve legal argument which is 
governed by the same standards dealing with Appellate review and 
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construction of language in a Judgment. This introductory sec-
tion, and the legal principal set forth herein, shall apply to 
both of the following sections of the Brief. 
A. Standards of Appellate Review. To successfully 
appeal Orders entered by the trial court in hearings relating to 
Divorce matters, the Appellant "must show that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the Findings of Fact or that the 
trial court has abused its discretion." Thompson v. Thompson, 
709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 
1982). As stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(Utah 1980): "On appeal, this court will not disturb the action 
of the Trial Court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary, or the trial court has abused its discretion or 
misapplied principals of law." Additionally, the court has broad 
power to review both facts and law in matters of equity. Boals 
v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983). 
B. Principal of Interpretation of Judgments. The 
language of Judgments is subject to construction according to 
rules that apply to all written instruments. Moon Lake Water 
Users Association v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1975). In 
the event the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it 
must be enforced as written; however, when the meaning is ambi-
guous, the entire record or extrinsic evidence may be resorted to 
for construction of the judgment. Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign 
Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). If the language of a 
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contract, or in this case a judgment, is unambiguous, interpreta-
tion is a question of law and, on review, the court will accord 
the trial court's construction no particular weight, reviewing 
its action under a "correctness standard". Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). However, if the language is ambi-
guous and the trial court bases its construction on extrinsic 
evidence, the construction is reviewed as a question of fact and 
the court's review is "strictly limited". Craig Food Industries, 
Inc. v. Wheihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1987). 
II 
THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 REQUIRING THAT MR. 
BETTINGER'S EQUITY BE DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF MRS. BOIES 
REMARRIAGE IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPALS OF LEGAL CONSTRUCTION AND 
THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE FINDINGS THEREON. 
Since there are no findings relating to the basis upon 
which the court interpreted Paragraph 7 of the Decree as 
requiring that the Defendant's equity be determined as of the 
date of Mrs. Boies remarriage, it is assumed that the court 
followed standard methods of document interpretation. The court 
presumably made its determination based either upon the plain 
language of Paragraph 7, or, relied on extrinsic evidence and the 
record in the case. In either instance, the court's ruling is in 
error and should be reversed. 
A. The Plain language of Paragraph 7 requires that 
equity be determined as of the date of sale. While not a model 
of clarity, Paragraph 7 of the Decree quite clearly contemplates 
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that Mr. Bettinger's equity will be determined as of the date 
when the house is sold, not the date of the remarriage of Mrs. 
Boies. Paragraph 7 states that Plaintiff is awarded the home 
"subject to a lien thereon for one-half of the equity that may be 
in the house at the time of liquidation (which contemplates an 
increasing equity as the value increases)." This initial sen-
tence establishes the time when equity is to be determined, i.e. 
nat the time of liquidation" deliniates sale of the marital domi-
cile. Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968) defines 
liquidation as: "the act or process of settling or making clear, 
fixed, and determinate that which before was uncertain or 
unassertained." Based upon the next sentence, it would not be 
possible to make a final determination until the date of sale 
since Mr. Bettinger's equity "is defined as fair market value or 
sales price . . . less the amount of mortgages, costs of improve-
ments made by Plaintiff and costs of sale." The language thus 
clearly indicates that the parties contemplated that no deter-
mination of liquidation value could be made until after the sale 
of property. 
The next sentence of Paragraph 7 underscores this 
interpretation. It states that the lien shall be foreclosable 
when the youngest child reaches 18, or when the home is sold or 
when the Plaintiff remarries. Two points should be made about 
this sentence. One is that there is a significant difference 
between the term "liquidation" used in the introductory sentence, 
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and the term "foreclosable". Foreclosable merely means a 
triggering event which allows a process to be initiated and then 
ends up with a final determination of equity, i.e. liquidation. 
The second point is that in any foreclosure process, the final 
value of equity is not determined until a completed sale occurs. 
The trial court errored in its reading of the language 
of Paragraph 7 by determining that the defendant's lien would be 
valued as of the date of remarriage and not the date of sale. 
B. Extrinsic evidence and the record are contrary to 
the findings and ruling of the court. If the court determined 
that Paragraph 7 is ambiguous and resorted to extrinsic evidence 
for interpretation, its findings and ruling is contrary to the 
evidence in the record. Throughout all of the proceedings 
relating to interpretation of Paragraph 7, the only evidence sub-
mitted on the point of the intent of the parties was Carolyn 
Boies1 April 9, 1986 Affidavit which, under Utah law, the court 
must review to interpret the ambiguities. Paragraph 4.b. of Mrs. 
Boies1 Affidavits states that the basis for agreeing upon the 
language in Paragraph 7 is that Mr. Bettinger "repeatedly 
expressed to me at the time of the divorce his belief that the 
property would again double in value during the 1980's and that 
he wanted to participate in that increase in equity on an invest-
ment basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to arrive 
at a settlement whereby he would retain the house as an invest-
ment and continue to pay the mortgage on the property and whereby 
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I would allow him to receive any increase in equity which might 
occur during the decade of the 1980's rather than taking one-half 
the equity as it existed at the time of the Decree in 1980.H 
(Exhibit MB" p. 2-3; Record 312-313). 
Further, at Paragraph 4.C. Mrs. Boies states: 
"To resolve my claim for child support and possession of 
the house and Cass Bettinger*s competing claim for con-
tinuing interest in any equity appreciation in the home, 
we arrived at the settlement contained in Paragraph 7 of 
the Decree of Divorce separating the house and mortgage 
entirely from the child support. First. Paragraph 7, 
in its first sentence, contains our agreement that the 
Defendant's equity interest in the home would be calcu-
lated as of the date of sale of the home, and rather 
than as of 1980, which contemplated an increasing value 
of the equity." (Exhibit "B", p. 3; Record 313). 
Additionally, Mr. Bettinger1s actions and words con-
tained in the record are consistent with his equity being deter-
mined as of the date of sale. Mr. Bettinger made no attempt to 
"foreclose" his lien on the marital domicile. In each year, he 
took an interest deduction for the mortgage payments he made on 
his tax returns. Further, after Mrs. Boies1 remarriage in 
August, 1984, on two occasions Mr. Bettinger wrote Mrs. Boies 
urging a significantly higher sale price of the home than Mrs. 
Boies believed the home was worth and suggesting a variety of 
different repairs to the home to make it more sellable. 
Certainly if Mr. Bettinger believed that his equity was to be 
determined as of the date of Mrs. Boies remarriage, the sale 
price and fixing up the home to increase its value at sale would 
have no bearing. 
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No where in the Findings of Fact is there set forth any 
evidence of the intent of the parties or their actions 
demonstrating the understanding of the Divorce Decree. Most 
significantly, the evidence contained in Mrs. Boies Affidavit is 
unrebutted and is determinative of the issue. The court's 
failure to rely on the entire record and the available extrinsic 
evidence when interpreting the ambiguities of Paragraph 7, if any 
exists, is clear error. Conclusion of Law No. 1, that the 
Defendant is entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital 
domicile as of the Plaintiff's remarriage on August 30, 1984 is 
wholely unsupported by the record in this case. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "IMPROVEMENTS BY 
PLAINTIFF" IS CONTRARY TO THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 7 AND WAS 
MADE BY THE COURT WITHOUT A BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree states that equity would be 
defined by determining "fair market value or sale" and 
subtracting therefrom existing mortgages, costs of sale and 
"improvements made by the Plaintiff". Interpretation of the term 
"improvements" thus becomes critical to both Mrs. Boies and Mr. 
Bettinger with respect to the amount of money they will receive 
from the proceeds of sale. The Court made its interpretation 
without the benefit or direction of case law or submission of 
evidence on the point. 
Upon Motion of the Defendant and over objection of the 
Plaintiff, after the hearing on December 12, 1987, the court 
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issued its ruling holding that the term "improvements" would be 
construed to mean only "capital improvements" made by the 
Plaintiff. Prior to the hearing on December 12, 1987, neither 
counsel submitted or was requested to submit any law on the 
point. Additionally, no evidence was taken by way of affidavit 
or testimony. The court simply ruled on the issue. There were 
subsequently no findings of fact issued to establish a basis upon 
which the court ruled. 
The court's ruling had a significant adverse affect on 
Mrs. Boies in that she lost several thousands of dollars. Mrs. 
Boies lived in the home from the time of her divorce on August 
14, 1980 to her remarriage August 30, 1984, and resided with her 
new husband in the marital domicile until June, 1985. In June, 
1985, Mrs. Boies and her husband moved to a condominium but 
thereafter continued to maintain the property. 
From August 14, 1980 to August 30, 1984, Mrs. Boies 
expended $4,308.86 on improvements and upkeep of the home (see 
Exhibit "F" hereto; Record 559). From August 30, 1984 to the 
date of sale, August 31, 1987, Mrs. Boies expended the sura of 
$10,283.50 (see Exhibit "G" hereto; Record 585). In her April 9, 
1985 Affidavit, Mrs. Boies states that she and her husband per-
formed literally every task relating to upkeep, maintenance and 
improvements on the home (see Exhibit "B", Para. 22, 23; Record 
321, 322). These improvements are listed on the exhibits hereto. 
Significantly, $7,800.00 was expended by Mrs. Boies to install a 
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new roof after the old flat roof leaked causing the ceiling in 
the home to collapse (Exhibit "B", Para. 23; Tr. 38). The court 
found that the new gabled roof was an "improvement"; however, the 
court declined to include expenditures for replacement and repair 
of the ceiling or related repair as coming within the definition 
of "improvements", even though many of those improvements had 
been suggested or requested by Mr. Bettinger. From 1980 to 1987, 
Mrs. Boies expended the sum of $14,592.36 and was awarded only 
$7,964.79 in the court's ruling. 
The court should recall that Mr. Bettinger negotiated 
the parties Settlement Agreement to contemplate the marital domi-
cile as his investment. That is why he paid the mortgage in 
addition to receiving the tax benefits. However, he paid 
literally nothing towards the improvements made by Mrs. Boies 
except for the gabled roof and screens on the windows after the 
ruling by the court. That ruling is inconsistent with the par-
ties' intention that the home was Mr. Bettinger's investment pro-
perty. 
The plain language of Paragraph 7 states that equity 
will be determined by establishing a value for the home and then 
subtracting "improvements made by Plaintiff". No where are 
"capital improvements" mentioned. The court's interpretation is 
contrary to the plain language of the Decree and is an error at 
law. 
The court's ruling is also contrary to inferences drawn 
from the available evidence on the point. The trial court's 
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interpretation of "improvements" should be reversed and all 
expenditures which were made by Mrs. Boies to improve the pro-
perty from the date of divorce to the date of sale should be 
deducted from the sale price and evenly shared between the par-
ties. 
CONCLUSION 
The court's construction and interpretation of Paragraph 
7 is contrary to principals of law and the evidence preponderates 
against the findings and conclusions. The language of Paragraph 
7 and the only evidence submitted on the issue of intent requires 
that Mr. Bettinger's equity be determined as of the date of sale, 
not the date of Mrs. Boies' remarriage. 
The term "improvements" applies to all the expenditures 
made by Mrs. Boies improving the home and not just "capital 
expenditures". The trial court's rulings of each issue should be 
reversed and appropriate orders entered by this court. 
DATED this / ? day of April, 1989. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
^•p#f 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
35200-35204.1 
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ROBERT B. SYKES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-0222 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
6J-&9 fi/O . *-?** 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
On the 1st day of August, 1980, this matter came before | 
the above-entitled Court, the Honorable James Sawaya, District i 
Judge, presiding. Both parties were present and the Plaintiff \ 
was represented by Attorney Robert B. Sykes, and Defendant was | 
represented by Attorney Delwin T. Pond. Counsel for Plaintiff ! 
presented an oral stipulation regarding the complete settlement j 
of this matter, which stipulation was acknowledged to be correct 
I 
by Defendant and ordered by the Court to be incorporated in the j 
Findings of Fact and Decree. Based upon the foregoing, and good j 
cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: j 
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from j 
Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to become j 
final six months from the date of entry. j 
2. Plaintiff is granted care, custody and control of | 
the four (4) minor children of this marriage, to wit: J 
MICHELLE, born June 19, 1967 j 
CHRISTOPHER CASS, born January 15, 1971 j 
JONATHON SCOTT, born March 11, 1972 
NICOLE, born January 4, 1977 
Defendant shall have reasonable visitation with each of the j 
children upon reasonable notice. j 
i 
VJUII uar.e uuumy, uian i^^JLJLJULPJL A X"V 
MG U1980 
j^Sttrfing Cvans. Cleric 3rd Dftt. Court 
•puty 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-80-931 
3. Defendant is ordered to pay for child support the 1 
amount of $200.00 per month per child for a total of $800.00 per , 
month at the time of this Decree. One-half of the total sum for 
child support is payable on or before the first (1st) day of I 
every month beginning August 1.. 1980, and the balance is payable 
on or before the sixteenth (16th) day of every month thereafter. | 
t 
Payment is to be made by way of check. I 
4. Defendant is ordered to increase the amount of | 
i 
child support payments each year on August 1 by an amount of 8 J 
( 
percent. I 
5. Plaintiff is granted alimony in the amount of $1.00 j 
i 
per year. j 
t 
6. Defendant is ordered to keep in force all medical j 
insurance on the children which he has through his employment. , 
Defendant is further ordered to pay any major or unusual medical ! 
or dental expenses such as orthodonic braces. j 
7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the j 
marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510 South, ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien thereon for one-half of , 
the equity that may be in the house at the time of liquidation 
(which contemplates an increasing equity as the value increases). . 
The equity is defined as the fair market value or sales price at 
the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set 
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements ! 
made by Plaintiff and costs of sale. This lien shall not be 
forecloseable until the youngest child reaches 18, or until the 
home is sold or until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of 
any of these events, two-thirds of the house payments then made j 
shall be converted to child support and that sum shall be paid to j 
the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child support. | 
8. Defendant is ordered to continue making the I 
payments on the home. Defendant shall also be entitled to take 
the entire interest portion of the house payment as a deduction j 
for himself as well as three (3) income tax exemptions on the , 
children with Plaintiff to receive one exemption on the youngest 
child at the present time. 
9. With respect to personal property, Defendant is 
awarded his books, the stereo (with two speakers to be left | 
behind), a cock bench, two swivel chairs, a moro chest, enough j 
bedding, kitchen utensils, etc. to start his own household, the j 
Toyota Celica, subject to the balance owed thereon, a lamp from 
India, the bookcase wall unit, as well as his own personal i 
l 
effects, clothing, knick-knacks, and such other personal property , 
as the parties may divide among themselves. Plaintiff is awarded 
the balance of the personal property. Each party will assume and 
pay any obligations on any of the property awarded by the 
Decree. 
10. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all I 
household debts through the date of the Decree as well as those ! 
specified in the Complaint. I 
11. The Stipulation entered into by the parties in open 
court on Auqust lr 1980, is incorporated into this Decree by j 
reference. ! 
I 
12. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance 
payable to Plaintiff and/or the children in a sufficient amount 
t 
to protect the expectancy interest of the children to child 
support during their minority. 
13. Plaintiff is awarded $200.00 judgment for 
attorney's fees against Defendant, which Defendant should pay ' 
within thirty (30) days. 
DATED this ^ /t/ day of August 1980. j 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
W STERLING EV/ MS 
O O O O A J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Hand Delivery 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the 
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE upon Mr. Delwin Pondf Attorney 
for Defendant by causing a true and correct copy thereof to 
be hand delivered to said person at his office at the 
following address: 
Mr. Delwin T. Pond 
Attorney at Law 
1174 East 2700 South 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 
on this 13th day of August, 1980. 
ROBERT B. SYKTp*' 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
OOOO/M-
Lfli-MEbl 
MARY C. OORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORFORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND KIR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO 
AFFIDAVIT OF CASS BETTINGER 
Civil No. D 80 931 
Judge David Young 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss, 
) 
I, CAROLYN BOIES, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as 
follows : 
1. I am the plaintiff to the above action and the former wife of the 
defendant, Cass Bettinger. 
2. Defendant and I were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered in the 
above court on August 14, 1980. 
3. Defendant and I are the parents of four children, whose names and 
dates of birth are as follows: Michelle, born June 19, 1967, Christopher 
Cass, born January 15, 1971 , Jonathon Scott, born March 11 , 1972 and Nicole, 
born January 4, 1977. 
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MATTERS PERTAINING ID INTERPRETATION OF DIVORCE DECREE 
4. The Decree of Divorce entered between defendant and myself was 
reached by stipulation. It is critical for the court to understand how the 
agreement contained in the Decree was arrived at. This is so because the 
Decree, though containing what may seem to be unusual provisions to the court, 
means exactly what it states upon its face, and the provisions of the Decree 
were arrived at after extensive negotiation between the parties and their 
counsel and after I had bargained away several claims I wanted in the divorce. 
The negotiation process which resulted in the Decree is as follows: 
a. Initially, I sought from Cass Bettinger, the custody of our four 
children, who were all minors at the time, and child support in the sum of 
$300.00 per month, per child, for a total support obligation of $1,200.00 per 
month. I asked for possession of the house, and in exchange, I agreed that I 
would pay the mortgage on the property and that the house would be subject to 
a lien in favor of Cass Bettinger for one-half the amount of our equity as it 
existed in 1980, at the time of the divorce. 
b. Defendant, Cass Bettinger, rejected this offer of settlement on 
my part and stated to me at the time that his reasons for rejecting the offer 
had to do with his perception of the increasing value of our home. Our hone 
had doubled in value from the date we purchased it in the early 1970's through 
the date of the divorce in 1980. Cass Bettinger repeatedly expressed to me at 
the time of the divorce his belief that the property would again double in 
value during the 1980fs and that he wanted to participate in that increase in 
equity on an investment basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to 
arrive at a settlement whereby he would retain the house as an investment and 
continue to pay the mortgage on the property and whereby I would allow him to 
receive any increase in equity which might occur during the decade of the 
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1980fs, rather than taking one-half the equity as it existed at the time of 
the Decree in 1980. He also agreed to pay one-half the cost of improvements 
to maintain his investment. To date, he has paid nothing. 
c. To resolve my claim for child support and possession of the 
house and Cass Bettinger's competing claim for a continuing interest in any 
equity appreciation in the home, we arrived at the settlement contained in 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce separating the house and mortgage 
entirely from the child support. First, Paragraph 7, in its first sentence, 
contains our agreement that defendant's equity interest in the home would be 
calculated as of the date of sale of the home, rather than as of 1980, which 
contemplated an increasing value of the equity. I was awarded the home and 
the lien to Cass Bettinger for one-half the "increasing" equity would be 
payable to him upon our youngest child reaching the age of 18 years, upon my 
election to sell the home or upon my remarriage. Upon the first to occur of 
these contingencies, I was to receive, in addition to the child support 
ordered in Paragraph 3 of the Decree, an additional amount of two-thirds of 
the house payment on the home as additional child support to offset my costs 
in providing another residence for the children. Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of 
the Decree, defendant was to pay the mortgage payments on the hone, not as 
child support, but as a real estate investment for as long as we retained the 
property. It was contemplated by myself and by defendant, and we discussed at 
the time we reached the stipulation in this case, that this would actually 
create a slight reduction in the defendant's obligation to pay support to me 
in the event of my remarriage. We discussed the fact that this would occur 
because we assumed that the house would sell quickly upon being placed on the 
market and that because of the sale of the home, defendant would be relieved 
from the obligation in the Decree to pay the mortgage. We agreed on the fact 
that his payment of the mortgage on our home until the date the home sold 
would not be support for the children, and that it would be in addition to the 
$200.00 per month, per child, child support ordered by the court and would 
not be subject to dividing as the children left home. Mr. Bettinger1 s 
contention that my remarriage should place some of the burden of child support 
on my new husband is absurd. My new husband should not be required to support 
the Bettinger children, especially since he pays child support for four 
children of his own and Mr. Bettinger earns over three times what my new 
husband earns. 
5. The understanding we both agreed to of Paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the 
Decree of Divorce at the time we negotiated for settlement on the terms of the 
Decree was that I would receive $200.00 per month, per child, for any minor 
child in my custody, that I would have the house payment made on the marital 
home until such time as the home sold, and that, in addition, upon my moving 
the children to a new hone, I would receive an amount equal to two-thirds the 
mortgage payment on the marital home, which would be paid as additional child 
support. I agreed to this arrangement in the interest of negotiation in lieu 
of going to trial and demanding $300.00 per month, per child as a set sum of 
child support. The two-thirds mortgage payment was intended to supplement 
housing costs for the children in a new residence, but does not affect Mr. 
Bettinger1 s obligation for the house payment as long as it exists. 
6. Paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce provides that my child support 
payments of $200.00 per child, per month, were to increase by eight percent 
(8%) on August 1 of each year after the Decree, which has been ignored by Mr. 
Bettinger since February of 1985. 
CALCULATION OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES 
7. In January, 1985, the above-referenced matter was tried before Judge 
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John A. Rokich. As a result of that trial, I was awarded continuing custody 
of our minor children, Nicole and Chris. Our daughter, Michelle, achieved her 
majority shortly thereafter and became emancipated. Defendant was awarded 
custody of our son, Jon. After that change in custody, defendant was to 
continue to pay me child support for the two children in my custody at the 
rate of $200.00 per month, per child, together with the annual eight percent 
(8%) increase associated with each of those child support payments, and 
together with an additional $25.00 per child in my custody, per month. The 
provisions regarding the house, payment of the mortgage on the house, and 
payment of the additional child support in the amount of two-thirds the 
mortgage payment continued unchanged, the two-thirds amount going into effect 
if and when we vacated the premises and I began to incur housing costs for the 
children. 
8. After the hearing regarding change of custody in February, 1985, 
defendant visited my home and left his own calculation of how child support 
should be set after our son, Jon, went to live with him. That calculation is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit 
,fA.M I recognize my former husband's handwriting and the document as Exhibit 
"A" is in his handwriting. This document demonstrates his verification to me 
in early 1985 that he interpreted the child support obligation, after the 
change in custody, as follows, and not as he now claims in his Memorandum 
a. Prior to the change in custody, his support obligation was 
$544.00, payable on the first of the month and $544.00 payable on the 16th of 
the month, together with the mortgage payment of $292.00, payable to 
Prudential, for a total support obligation of $1,380.00 per month. The 
$544.00 en the first and $544.00 on the 16tb of the month reflects the support 
obligation of $200.00 per month, per child, for all four children, together 
5
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with the annual increases in support of eight percent (8%). This is the 
calculation reflected on Exhibit "A" by the word "was/1 
b. Cass Bettinger then indicated to me his understanding that the 
total support obligation of $1,380,00 should be divided in half because one 
child would be emancipated and he would have one child, leaving me with 
custody of two children. After this obligation was divided in half, he also 
indicated to me that there should be paid, in addition to that one-half, 
another $25.00 per month, per child in my custody, as ordered by Judge Rokich 
in early 1985. This left him with a total monthly support obligation of 
$715.00 per month, and is reflected in that portion of Exhibit "A" by the word 
"row." 
c. Of the total support obligation of $715.00 per month payable 
after the change in custody, $292.00 was to be paid to Prudential for the 
mortgage on the marital home and $211.50 was to be paid on the first and 
$211.50 was to be paid on the 16th of every month. In other words, I was to 
receive, directly, a total of $423.00 per month as child support. This is 
reflected in the mathematical calculations contained in the lower portion of 
Exhibit "A." 
9. In early 1985, the mortgage payment on the marital payment was 
$292.00 per month. In 1986, it increased to $333.00 per month, for the last 
11 months of the year. Effective February, 1987, it has decreased to $310.00 
per month. 
10. In addition to the child support set forth by the Decree and admitted 
to by Cass Bettinger in Exhibit "A," I am entitled to receive a sum equal to 
two-thirds the house payment as additional support, divided equally between 
the two monthly payments as of the time the children were relocated to a new 
residence. Effective February 1, 1985 (the time the custody change became 
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effective) the total amount owed on the first of the month was $297.00 and the 
total amount owed on the 16th of the month was $297.00. ($544.00 -f 2 = 
$272.00, + $25.00 additional support awarded by Judge Rokich = $297.00. the 
additional $25.00 per month, per child was awarded because, although the child 
support was decreased by 50%, my actual living costs were only decreased by 
10%, when Jon moved.) 
11. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated 
as Exhibit "BM is the true and current calculation of child support 
arrearages, commencing with February 1, 1985, and continuing through the 
present. As of the end of March, 1987, the total support arrearage owed to me 
by defendant was $10,086.80. 
12. As defendant had skipped payment totally for February, 1985, and 
continued erroneously to claim the house payment as support, in May, 1985, I 
retained the services of my former counsel, Mr, Con Kostopulos, to assist me 
in making a claim for the child support manipulation and arrearages against 
the defendant. My Order to Show Cause on support arrearages was heard by the 
Commissioner in September, 1985, and the Coamissioner issued a recommendation 
on December 31, 1985, to the effect that defendant was indebted to me for 
child support arrearages through October, 1985, in the sum of $2,705.50. Both 
the Coamissioner and the Office of Recovery Services have studied the Decree 
and the evidence (attached) and have determined defendant is in arrears and 
the child support is due as stated in Exhibit ffB.ff I request that the Office 
of Recovery Services1 and the Coamissioner1 s recoamendations as to child 
support arrearages be sustained, and that I be granted an additional judgment 
against defendant for arrearages incurred after October, 1985, as well as the 
amounts previously reduced to judgment by Judge Billings in 1986. 
13. In addition to being consistently in arrears in his child support, 
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defendant has failed and refused to make his child support payments in a 
timely manner. When I have requested that the payments be sent on time, Mr. 
Bettinger has responded with, "I'll pay it when I damn well please11 and "Mast 
waiien don't get any child support. You're lucky I'm willing to pay anything 
at all." As Exhibit "B" indicates, Mr. Bettinger has often been over two 
weeks late, and as much as 42 days late, in the payment of his child support. 
This has wrecked havoc with my personal bucjget and personal financial 
planning, since my bills are due on a set schedule and I cannot fail to pay 
the bills simply becaus Mr. Bettinger does not pay me child support on time. 
As a result of this, I have had to borrow money and use credit cards to live, 
and to make up the gaps between the time my bills are due and the time Mr. 
Bettinger finally pays his child support. It is my desire that the court 
grant me a judgment for child support arrearages pursuant to my Order to Show 
Cause which is the true subject matter of this action now before the court, 
and that the court order Mr. Bettinger to pay future child support in a timely 
manner to the court, rather than directly to me. 
MATTERS RELATING TO SALE OF HOME 
14. Defendant now claims that is unfair for him to be assessed child 
support, the eight percent (8%) increase on child support, the additional 
two-thirds of the mortgage payment as more child support, and the mortgage 
payment itself. This situation, and any hardship to defendant, are a result 
of the fact that the home has not sold in the two and one-half years it has 
been on the market. This failure of the home to sell is a direct result of 
defendant's unreasonableness in setting the sales price on the home and in 
dealing with the home when it has been listed for sale. It would be grossly 
unfair to penalize me by reducing my child support, or by taking away the 
benefits guaranteed to me by the Decree, in view of the fact that the 
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financial squeeze defendant and I are both suffering is the result of his 
unreasonable behavior with regard to the sale of the home. 
15. I remarried in August, 1984. This was the first of the 
contingencies to occur referred to in Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce. 
16. At the time of my marriage to my new husband, my husband and I made 
an offer to purchase Mr. Bettingerfs equity in the hone and to assume the 
mortgage. The offer was for cash of $22,869.00, which was calculated as 
follows: 
Total Value of Home in 1984 $85,000.00 
Less 6% Real Estate Commission 5,100.00 
Less Mortgage Existing in August, 1984 20,162.00 
Less Estimated Costs of Sale Including Points and Fees 2,000.00 
Less Estimated Costs of Improvements Necessary to Make the 
Home Saleable and/or Habitable, Including Installing a 
New Roof and Ceilings 12,000.00 
Sub-Total - Total Equity in Heme $45,783.00 
Estimated Value of Mr. Bettinger's Equity as of August, 1984 $22,869.00 
17. My husband and I arrived at the value of $85,000.00 based upon 
advice given to us by three separate real estate agents who viewed the home in 
the sunnier of 1984 that, with a glut of houses on the market and mortgage 
interest rates at 15%, the home was unlikely to sell within a reasonable 
period of time for more than $80,000.00 to $85,000.00, and that the roof would 
need to be replaced and other repairs would need to be made on the property 
before it would sell for that price. 
18. Defendant claimed, in September of 1984, that the true market value 
of the home was $125,000.00, and he refused to accept the offer of $22,869.00. 
I listed the bone for sale with a real estate agency in Salt Lake City in 
September of 1984 for a sales price of $125,000.00, in accordance with the 
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statement of the defendant, even though I personally believed and real estate 
agents advised me that they believed the home would not sell for more than the 
$85,000.00. 
19. Since we were anxious to move, we had already selected a 
five-bedroom home and a three-bedroom condominium and were awaiting the 
outcome of the cusotdy issue to see how large a home we were going to need. 
That was settled in February, 1985, and we inmediately initiated purchase of 
the condominium, closing in 60 days. Although we were anxious to move, we 
stayed in the house over the summer, as our real estate agent advised us that 
a house is much more showable and likely to sell if furnished and occupied. 
We agreed to stay for the sunmer to try to effectuate a timely sale, even 
though we were already making payments on the condominium. Since Mr. 
Bettinger~ would not accept our cash offer and the house did not sell over the 
sunmer, my husband and I eventually moved the family to the new location in 
August of 1985, necessitating leaving the property vacant. 
20. From August of 1984 through August of 1985, the home was listed for 
two six-month real estate listings. The listing price was dropped to 
$113,000.00 for the listing from February, 1985 to August, 1985. Not one 
person even came to look at the home while it was listed for $125,000.00, 
although several open houses were held. Only a few people came to look at the 
home while it was listed for $113,000.00. No one made any offer of purchase 
on the property between August of 1984 and August of 1985. 
21. My husband and I spent a great deal of time and money refurbishing 
the home and keeping it in condition to show during 1984 and 1985. Although 
Mr. Bettinger is claiming the time we were in the home as a "free ride," in 
actuality my new husband painted the entire house, inside and out, installed 
rain gutters and new screens throughout, bought a new disposal, had new 
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carpeting installed in the basement and made numerous other repairs and 
renovations entirely at his own expense and time. During the four years I had 
the home before I remarried, Mr. Bettinger contributed nothing to the care and 
upkeep, neither physically or financially, nor has he ever inquired of me, 
even once, as to the status of the house the entire time it has been for sale. 
My new husband, before we were married, carried the majority of the burden for 
maintenance on the house, which is why its value is high today. His efforts 
are resulting in nothing but gain for Mr. Bettinger as far as his equity is 
concerned. 
22. After my husband and I moved out of the home in August, 1985, he and 
I continued to do all maintenance and upkeep on the home. Defendant has never 
done anything to maintain the home or keep it in a showable condition. My 
husband and I did all the mowing, raking of leaves from 14 fruit trees, 
watering, weeding and general maintenance on the home to keep it showable, 
even though we were no longer occupying the home. I bore the entire physical 
and financial burden of upkeep while the house stood vacant, as well as having 
the burden of maintaining my own hone, working full-time, caring for two minor 
children and working toward a university degree at night so that I could 
better support myself and my children. 
23. The home had a flat roof which had been the single major drawback to 
a timely sale, other than the defendant's insistence that the property be 
listed for a ridiculously high sales price. During the extremely wet winter 
and spring of 1985/1986, the flat roof deteriorated, causing major leakage and 
ceiling damage in five areas of the house. The ceilings collapsed completely 
in the front hall in the early spring of 1986, necessitating major clean-up 
and repair. I personally engaged the contractor who installed a new pitched 
roof over the flat roof and new ceilings on the interior of the home. The 
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house was relisted for sale, in excellent saleable condition, at a sales price 
of $103,000.00 in the sunnier of 1986, and has been shorai regularly since then 
at that price listing. We still received no offers on the home and regularly 
received feedback from agents showing the home that the price was too high. 
We lowered the sales price to $99,500.00 in the fall of 1986, and again 
lowered it, to $93,500.00 in March, 1987. 
24. The amount of money which I have put into the home since my 
remarriage in the form of maintenance, insurance and utilities has equalled 
that paid by Mr. Bettinger in house payments, yet he is subtracting one-half 
the amount of that house payment from the child support paid to me, resulting 
in my bearing 75% of the financial burden on the house for the past two years. 
Mr. Bettinger earns seven times more money than I do. 
25. Mr. Bettinger has claimed the entire interest expense and property 
tax expense on the home as a tax deduction for himself for the tax years 1984, 
1985 and 1986. If I am, in fact, to be deemed to carry one-half the mortgage 
burden on the property as Mr. Bettinger claims, then I ought to receive the 
tax benefits of making the interest payments and property tax payments for 
1984, 1985 and 1986, and we should be ordered to amend our income tax returns 
accordingly. Also, Mr. Bettinger should be required to reimburse me for 
one-half the maintenance, utilities and insurance payments I have made. 
26. An accounting of my expenditures on the home is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "C." 
27. In addition to the burdens I have been under referred to in the 
paragraphs above, defendant' s mother passed away on October 1, 1986, leaving 
her entire estate to my four children and listing me at Trustee and Personal 
Representative. This has been a tremendously time-consuming proposition, in 
addition to the other burdens which I have had for the past six months. I was 
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physically and financially unable to maintain the home adequately with the 
additional burden of this estate to manage. I was also advised by my 
insurance agent at this time that he was obliged to cancel my homeowner's 
insurance because an unoccupied home was not insurable, I advertised for a 
housesitter and Elias Duran was the best applicant for the job. He occupies 
one room of the house and agreed to maintain the house and yard in a clean, 
tidy, showable condition, as well as make the home available to prospective 
buyers, all of which he has done with a high degree of excellence. He also 
agreed that he would move upon notice in the event the house sold. Eli's 
presence has also deterred break-ins and vandalism, which were a problem when 
the home was unoccupied. I chose to have a housesitter rather than to rent 
the house because I was not prepared to offer a lease and renters could not 
necessarily be depended upon to have the house showable and available, nor 
would they be prepared to move quickly were an offer to purchase the house to 
come in. They likely might view it as being in their best interest to keep 
the home in an unshowable condition to deter any sales. 
28. On March 25, 1987, I received an offer of purchase on the home for 
the sales price of $90,000.00. We have countered to sell for $91,500.00. I 
wish to point out to the court and to defendant that $90,000.00 is very close 
to the $85,000.00 sales price which we offered in 1984, and the offer of 
$90,000.00 has come after a new pitched roof has been placed on the home and 
the home has been coupletely repainted, interior and exterior, and has been 
partially recarpeted. Had Mr. Bettinger accepted my offer to cash him out at 
an assumed value of $85,000.00 in 1984, he would have received as much money 
as he is now going to receive as a result of the purchase offer that has been 
accepted in 1987. Any financial hardship Mr. Bettinger has suffered as a 
result of paying both the mortgage payment and child support since 1984 is a 
13 
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result of his own unreasonable refusal to accept a fair market cash-out offer 
two and one-half years ago. 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE ORTHODONTIA BILL 
29. Defendant alleged in court, on March 24, 1987, that I had received 
money for our sonfs orthodontic bill but that I had refused to pay the bill. 
This is untrue. I had never even been billed by the orthodontist much less 
refused to pay. The total amount billed by the orthodontist, Dr. W. Stratton, 
was $2,050.00. The amount paid by my insurance, Blue Cross Blue Shield, was 
$1,000.00, which represents the total allowable amount payable under the 
policy. Cass Bettinger has paid an additional $900.00. There is a balance 
owing of $150.00, which is owing in full by Cass Bettinger under the terms of 
the Decree, Paragraph 6, which requires defendant to pay for all orthodontic 
expenses of the children. A statement of the orthodontist to the effect that 
the total amount still owing on the bill is $150.00 is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "D." 
OTHER MATTERS 
30. The defendant earns an income in excess of $80,000.00 per year. My 
income is $11,000.00 per year. I ask the court to consider this income 
difference in considering the equities of who should pay financially for the 
hardships which have resulted from the failure of the home to sell. Over the 
past two years I have paid three times more in expenses than Mr. Bettinger has 
paid in mortgage payments, and I did not receive any tax benefits. 
31. I have incurred attorney1 s fees in pursuing the child support 
arrearages and in pursuing the issue of the defendants unreasonable behavior 
with regard to the sale of the home. I request that the court award me my 
court costs and attorney's fees herein. 
14 
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DATED THIS _£ day of {jAtuJ , 1987. 
CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES 
Plaintiff 
1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this JL day of UJfiAj 6 
My commission expires; 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
15 
•iLcD in CLr3 , / . '£ CF~ICE 
?a't L---- C:- r t :y Utah 
Robert M. McDonald, (#2175) 
MCDONALD & BULLEN DEC 3 0 1997 
Attorney for Defendant 
American Plaza III "* °"c' A 1r^^'cL'"t cc'J!t 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 "" L ' lt*^^ '_,_. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
ORDER &&0-<f£/ 
Judge David Young 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
Defendant's Motion For Order Dividing Proceeds of Sale of 
Marital Domicile was heard before the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Judge, on Monday, December 12, 1987. Present at said 
hearing were Robert M. McDonald, of the firm of McDonald & 
Bullen, representing Defendant and Craig Peterson, of the firm of 
Littlefield & Peterson, representing Plaintiff. The Court having 
heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the 
Affidavits and Memoranda filed by the parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant's equity in the marital domicile shall be 
determined on the basis of the market value of the marital domi-
cile in August, 1984. 
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2. An evidentiary hearing shall be held before this Court 
on Tuesday, January 19, 1988, at the hour of 8:30 A.M. to deter-
mine the value of the marital domicile in August, 1984. The 
parties shall make necessary arrangements for the appearance of 
their respective experts Jerry F. Kellgreen and Jerry R. Webber 
to testify as to said value. 
3. The term "improvements" as stated in paragraph 7 in the 
Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance the 
value of the marital domicile. 
4. In order to assist the parties in preparation for said 
hearing, the Court makes the following Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusions which remain subject to change or amendment: 
(a) The cost of the sale of the marital domicile shall be 
shared equally by the parties; 
(b) Plaintiff shall be liable for all unpaid taxes attri-
butable to periods after August, 1984; 
DATED this jffi^day of December, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
Htf«DLEY 
C i\(%Zxl^— 
Deputy Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the |y day of December, 1987, I 
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Order by placing said copy in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETER 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, u/ 841Q2 
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January 27, 1986 
Dear Carolyn, 
I am sure that you are as anxious as I am to see the house on 
4510 South sold. Naturally, Ifm sure we both want to get the best pos-
sible price. 
I have been through the house with a friend who is a realtor 
and ^ ho is a specialist in marketLi)g houses that need some work to make 
them marketable. He had several suggestions, based on extensive experience, 
with which I agree completely. 
1) Remove all walltex and mirror tiles from upstairs and paint 
the walls and ceilings; 
2) replace the out of date light fixtures upstairs and remove 
the outdated wrougjht iron screen in the dinii)g room; 
3) take down all the drapes since they are beyond repair; 
4) remove all the paneling in the basement and have it sheet-
rocked and painted (along with the ceilings); 
5) put in new carpet throughout; 
6) paint the kitchen cabinets with a good high-tech paint; and 
7) get rid of all the stuff in the garage and scattered through-
out the house. 
He estimates the cost of doing these things at frcm $5,000 to 
$10,000, but closer to the $5,000 figure. 
The house is listed at $99,000. Of that amount points and 
conmlssions will take about $9,000 leaving us $90,000. However, I really 
don't see hew the house can sell for that price in its present condition. 
I think there are three alternatives: 
1) Lower the price to $89,000 and hope someone sees the potential. 
2) We can spend the $5,000 to do the things we mentioned. I have 
a carpenter \dx> is very good, very fast and very inexpensive. He used to 
work for Consolidated Capital. We could get a good deal on the carpet and 
we could do the painting ourselves. 
3) I could buy out your equity for $25,000, go it alone and take 
the risks associated with trying to get the house sold in time - and at a price-
to cover my costs. 
I would prefer alternative two. With alternative one we would get 
about $80,000. After paying off the first mortgage that would leave us with 
$30,000 each. However, I still have doubts about the marketability of the 
house even at that price. Quite frankly, at this point I'd take tie $30,000 
and run if I could. 
I donft like alternative three because I think you could probably 
do better with alternatives one or two and I hate to take the risk of 
losing what I have to put into the house. Still, I can't offer more than 
$25,000 because of that risk. The market is still pretty soft. 
Carolyn, I just want to get the house sold as fast as possible 
at a fair price. I think we have to do something. Its just not going to 
sell as is in its present condition and current price. 
Please let me knew what you want to do. I'm open to suggestions 
The main thing is to do something and to do it right away. 
Yours very truly, 
:,wU*: 
/C O 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Date 
08-20-81 
08-25-81 
06-19-82 
06-19-82 
06-29-82 
10-06-82 
10-06-82 
10-13-82 
11-01-82 
11-05-82 
02-17-83 
04-08-83 
04-29-83 
06-11-83 
09-06-83 
09-30-83 
10-14-83 
01-27-84 
07-20-84 
08-30-84 
CAPITAL 
Item 
Carpet, two bedrooms, 
and stair 
Carpet, two bedrooms, 
and stair 
Livingroom carpet 
Livingroom carpet 
Livingroom carpet 
New disposal 
IMPROVEMENTS 
hall 
hall 
New disposal installation 
New water heater 
New range 
Bedroom window screens 
Replace cabinet doors 
Replace cabinet doors 
New range hood 
Floor Tile 
Floor sealer 
Cost 
233.59 
1,019.50 
417.90 
100.00 
312.76 
84.34 
38.25 
262.93 
472.50 
46.61 
192.08 
(stain) 18.02 
Front hall texturized wall 
Roof repair 
New kitchen counter 
New landscaping 
New living room drapes 
73.50 
68.22 
10.24 
67.68 
159.00 
606.92 
41.48 
83.34 
$4,308.86 
IV <^ 
Evidence 
Ck #264, Inv. 
Ck #405, Inv. 
Ck #593, Inv. 
Ck #594, Inv. 
Receipt #10349 
Inv. 015637 
Receipt #0745060 
Receipt 11-1-82 
Inv. 336177 » ^ ^ 0 
Inv. 168056 - ^ 
Receipt 221450 •&& ^ 
Ck #329, Inv. 
Copy ck #385 
Cash receipt 
Receipt, Bk statement 
Ck #423, Inv. 
Check register,-**^ 
Inv. 026571 
Cash receipts 
Visa charge receipt 
25539 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Date 
07-08-84 
08-06-84 
09-24-84 
09-25-84 
10-14-84 
1984 
02-05-85 
05-16-85 
05-17-85 
05-25-85 
05-30-85 
05-18-85 
08-06-85 
1985 
06-15-86 
08-12-86 
08-13-86 
08-14-86 
08-21-86 
COSTS OF SALE 
Item 
Bathroom faucets and mirror 
Back door screen (for listing) 
Replace scratched window 
(for listing) 
Replace scratched new window 
(for listing) 
New screens (enhance 
appearance) 
Painting 
Replace basement carpet 
(enhance appearance) 
Carpet cleaning (open house) 
Replace water damage ceiling 
Repair rain gutter 
Roof repair 
Resurface cabinets (enhance 
appearance) 
Repair fence (enhance 
appearance) 
Painting 
Repair disposal 
Replace roof 7 
Repair vandalism 
New ceiling 
Carpet cleaning (open house) 
Cost 
95.02 
31.61 
19.16 
75.30 
164.79 
212.49 
498.34 
19.95 
300.00 
54.54 
54.46 
20.26 
66.61 
30.63 
37.00 
,800.00 
48.06 
350.00 
17.98 
Evidence 
Receipt 
Inv. 397957 
Inv. 405027 
Receipt 711415 
Ck #648, receipts / 
8 cash receipts, 
ck #606 
Ck #667, Inv. 
Inv. A200322, 
Check register 
Ck #1034, Inv. 
Receipt 
Ck #1038, Inv. 
Receipt 893531 
Cash receipt 
4 cash receipts 
Receipt 7374 
Cks #1078, 1304, j^ ''' 
invoice-admitted 
for hearing on 
value 
Ck #1279, #1267 
Ck #1305, Inv. 
Ck #1309, Inv. ^ 
20. 08-23-86 Replace broken basement 
paneling 
21. 08-23-86 Replace light fixtures and 
other fixtures 
22. 08-26-86 Paint rooms 
23. 11-15-86 Repair front rain gutter 
24. 08-12-87 Replace plastic sky light 
18.34 Cash receipt 
63.19 Cash receipt 
248.47 Ck #1294, Inv. 
46.67 Cash receipt 
10.63 Cash receipt 
$10f283.50 
25540 
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Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN BETTINGER, aka : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
: CIVIL NO, D-80-931 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideration by the 
Court on the 9th day of February/ 1988. The plaintiff was 
present and represented by her attorney Craig M. Peterson. The 
defendant was present and represented by his attorney Robert M. 
McDonald. The Court heard the testimony of the witnesses, their 
appraisers, and the final arguments of counsel. Thereafter, the 
Court received trial Memoranda from each party that stated their 
respective positions, including the calculations that they would 
urge upon the Court in determining the distribution of the 
proceeds resulting from the sale. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court makes this its: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The Court finds that each party could and should have 
been more efficient and expeditious in selling the property, or 
bringing the matter appropriately to the Court's attention, and 
that thus each must bear some responsibility for the delay. 
BETTINGER V. BETTINGER PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2. The Court finds that the appropriate value of the home 
as of August 1984 was $95,000.00• 
3. That the unpaid mortgage was $20,304.00. 
4. That the costs of closing and sale were $6,113.00. 
5. The shared costs of preparing the home for sale 
include, and are limited to the following specific items: the 
roof repair and replacement - $7,800.00; the application of new 
screens on or about October 14, 1984 - $164.79; for a total of 
$7,964.78. All of the other costs and expenses requested the 
Court finds to have been substitution costs, or normal 
maintenance to the home and not shared expenses. 
6. The Court specifically finds that the defendant is not 
entitled to interest on the unpaid equity, except for a pro rata 
share of the interest that has accrued since the funds have been 
placed on deposit following closing of the sale and receipt of 
the proceeds. The Court specifically finds that the defendant is 
entitled to that portion of the accrued interest that would be 
attributable to the funds herein awarded to the defendant. 
7. Based upon the foregoing, the Court makes this specific 
calculation as to the defendant's equity: home value, August 
1984 - $95,000.00; minus shared expenses, as follows: mortgage-
$20,304.00; costs of closing - $6,113.00; capital improvements 
associated with preparation for closing - $7,964.79. Remaining 
net divisible equity - $60,618.21, divided by 2, equals 
BETTINGER V. BETTINGER PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
$30,309.11 due defendant, plus pro rata accrued interest on 
deposited funds. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare Findings and an 
Order in harmony with this Memorandum Decision, and submit them 
to opposing counsel for approval in harmony with the Local Rules. 
Dated this .day of February, 1988. 
H. D;XCN H*MOLEY 
By —^ ifctlfX^ , 
Deputy Clerk 
BETTINGER V. BETTINGER PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this l^j day of February, 1988: 
Craig M. Peterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Robert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Defendant 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C fifr±C^r 
MAR 8 1988 
tLXHJLBir I - P!'5D IN CLERK'S OFF5CE 
•-- — -• '" "~\,»* ? nire County Utah 
Robert M. McDonald, (#2175) 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. D-80-931 
Judge David Young 
oooOooo 
This matter came on for Hearing on February 9, 1988, before 
the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, sitting without a 
jury. Present at said Hearing w^re plaintiff and her attorney, 
Craig M. Peterson, and defendant and his attorney, Robert M. 
McDonald. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses, 
and having considered the arguments and memoranda submitted by 
the respective attorneys, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were divorced on August 14, 
1980. During the marriage the parties resided at 2740 East 4510 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, (hereinafter "marital domicile"). 
1 
2. Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984, Thereafter, she 
and her new husband occupied the marital domicile for a period of 
one year. After the one-year period, plaintiff and her new hus-
band took up residence in another home. 
3. The market value of the marital domicile on August 30, 
1984, was $95,000.00. The unpaid balance on the first mortgage 
against the marital domicile on August 30, 1984, was $20,304.00. 
4. Subsequent to August 30, 1984, plaintiff incurred the 
sum of $7,800.00 for installation of a gabled roof on the mari-
tal domicile and $164.79 for new screens on the marital domicile. 
These were capital improvements that enhanced the value of the 
home and gave rise to a corresponding increase in the market 
value of the home. 
5. Plaintiff made other expenditures with respect to the 
marital domicile. However, these additional expenditures consti-
tuted normal maintenance and are not the responsibility of 
defendant. 
6. The marital domicile was sold on August 13, 1987, for a 
purchase price of $91,500.00. The costs of sale were $6,113.00. 
7. The proceeds of sale were placed in an interest-bearing 
escrow account wherein Guardian Title Company is escrow agent. 
8. The delay in selling the marital domicile is found to be 
the fault of both parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes: 
1. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant is 
2 
entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital domicile deter-
mined as of the date of plaintiff's remarriage on August 30, 
1984. 
2. Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant's share 
of the equity was due and payable on August 30, 1984. 
3. Defendant is not entitled to interest on the amount of 
his equity which accrued prior to the time the sale proceeds were 
placed with the escrow agent. 
4. Both parties are entitled to interest that has accrued 
on their respective share of the escrowed funds since the funds 
were placed in an interest-bearing escrow account by the escrow 
agent. 
5. Each of the parties must bear one-half of the following 
costs and expenses: 
(a) Closing costs of $6,113.00; 
(b) Capital improvements of $7,964.78. 
6. On or about April 12, 1987, this Court entered judg-
ment against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00. Said judgment has 
not yet been satisfied. 
7. Defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent 
the sum of $30,309.11, together with interest that has accrued on 
said sum from the date said funds were placed in the interest-
bearing escrow account until said sum is paid to defendant. 
8. In addition to the sum stated in the preceding 
paragraph, defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent 
the sum of $500.00, together with interest at the rate of 12% per 
3 
annum from April 12, 1987, to the date of payment. Provided, 
however, that defendant shall first present to the escrow agent a 
Satisfaction of Judgment which shall be delivered to plaintiff 
upon payment of the sum stated in this paragraph. 
DATED this y < 3 a y of EolM?»ery, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge David/S. jYounj 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H:i'*QLSY 
0 °T 
_t£ ' ~ IT Ooputy Clerk 
I hereby certify that on the 3^t) ~" day of February, i988, I 
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by placing said copy in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows: 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(LAc^i £}AJH^CJL. 
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MCDONALD & BULLEN Mflft I I 1988 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, O R D E R 
Civil No. D-80-931 
Judge David Young 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
Hearing in this matter was conducted before the Honorable 
David S. Young, District Judge, on February 9, 1988. Present at 
said Hearing were plaintiff and her attorney, Craig Peterson of 
the firm of Littlefield & Peterson, and defendant and his 
attorney, Robert M. McDonald of the firm of McDonald & Bullen. 
The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses, the 
arguments of counsel, and having considered the authorities 
presented by the respective parties, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and heretofore having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Cass Bettinger is entitled to receive from 
Guardian Title Company, the escrow agent holding the proceeds of 
sale from the home located at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake 
1 
City, Utah, the sum of $30,309.11, together with all interest 
that has accrued on said sum from the date the sale proceeds were 
deposited in an interest-bearing escrow account to the date of 
payment to defendant. 
2. The escrow agent, Guardian Title Company, shall deliver 
to Robert M. McDonald the sum of $500.00, together with interest 
on said sum at the rate of 12% per annum from April 14, 1987, to 
the date of the delivery to Robert M. McDonald. Said funds shall 
be held by Robert M. McDonald in his trust account until further 
order of the Court with respect to the payment of the judgment 
entered by the Court on or about April 14, 1987, in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff. 
3. All proceeds remaining with escrow agent after payment 
of the sums above stated shall be delivered to plaintiff, Carolyn 
Boies. 
4. All objections heretofore made to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are reserved. 
DATED this Jf] day of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
ABJ^VED AS TO FORM: 
MCD0IMB 
LITTLfeFIELD & PETERSON 
D i s t r i c t J 
Qv 
Jyd^eJ J\— 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HtfOLKY 
offcti *£**. 
Deputy CI*** 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 531-0435 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka 
CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 88-0297-CA 
Category 14(b) 
ooOoo 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true 
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT BRIEF to Robert M. 
McDonald, MCDONALD & BULLEN, American Plaza III, 47 West 200 
South, #450, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this 
/ f^day of April, 1989. 
^ 
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